What is Sentience?
In the previous post (Ineffability of Qualia) we saw that the meaning of a color cannot be expressed objectively, because it is inherently subjective. The same goes for sentience.
| What is it like to see orange? | What is it like to be sentient? |
Let’s try some definitions:
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Let’s try some definitions
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| These definitions may be correct, but imagine reading them to someone who has never seen color (i.e. someone who was born blind, or totally color-blind). They cannot convey the meaning of orange to such a person. | These definitions may be correct, but imagine reading them to an insentient being. They cannot convey the meaning of sentience to an insentient being. |
| In fact, a totally color-blind person may even consider himself capable of experiencing orange, after reading these definitions. | In fact, an insentient reader may even consider itself sentient after reading these definitions. |
| This is because the colored words (oranges, yellow, red) carry additional meaning that can be understood only by color-capable people. | This is because the italicized terms (subjective experience, feel, perceive) carry additional meaning that can be understood only by sentient beings. |
| The meaning of orange is derived precisely from this additional meaning. | The meaning of sentience is derived precisely from this additional meaning. |
| A color (e.g. orange) cannot be defined in “uncolored” words; its meaning cannot be “captured” in an objective definition. | Sentience cannot be defined in “insentient” terms; its meaning cannot be “captured” in an objective definition. |
So, although it is not possible to “force across” a definition of sentience, it is possible for a (sentient) person to understand the meaning of sentience for themselves, just as it is possible to understand the meaning of orange, without being able to communicate it.
Next post: The Dualist’s Dilemma